quarta-feira, 1 de setembro de 2010 EUA | 12:35

GS Hatzius também acredita que FED pode acelerar compras de Treasuries no próximo FOMC

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eu concordo com ele…. risco de deflação nos EUA está aumentando rapidinho…… Não fique short em treasuries…. nao brinque com fogo! Juro longo pode cair mais….

How “Appreciable” Is the Risk of Deflation? (Hatzius)

  • The minutes of the August 10 FOMC contain the bald statement that “no member saw an appreciable risk of deflation.”  This seems surprising given (1) the recent data on economic activity, wages, and prices, (2) the decline in breakeven measures of inflation expectations, (3) a recent article suggesting that at least one FOMC member (President Bullard of St. Louis) is indeed quite worried about deflation, and (4) the observation by an unnamed meeting participant that “…survey measures of longer-run inflation expectations had remained positive in Japan throughout that country’s bout of deflation.”
  • Further signs of economic weakness and/or disinflation over the next few months would likely increase the perceived risk of deflation, and persuade the committee to address these risks via renewed quantitative easing.  Our best guess is that this will happen in late 2010 or early 2011, but if the economic activity data are very weak and/or breakeven inflation falls quickly, we would not rule out a move at the September 21 FOMC meeting.

The most surprising aspect of the August 10 FOMC minutes was the highlighted part of the following sentence (near the start of the discussion of the committee’s policy action): “While no member saw an appreciable risk of deflation, some judged that the risk of further near-term disinflation had increased somewhat.”  The “members” in this sentence are the five current Fed governors, including Chairman Bernanke, as well as the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Cleveland, Kansas City, New York, and St. Louis.  This is a stronger version of Chairman Bernanke’s assessment in his speech last Friday that “falling into deflation is not a significant risk for the United States at this time…” (emphasis added).

We don’t know exactly what the term “appreciable” means in terms of probabilities, but our interpretation is that the threshold would be no higher than 20%.  Moreover, we don’t know exactly what the term “deflation” means in terms of the measure used or the time period, but our interpretation is a negative year-on-year reading for the core PCE price index over the next 2-3 years—i.e., roughly through the end of the Fed’s formal forecast horizon.

We are surprised by this statement, for several reasons.

First, it seems to be at odds with the recent economic data.  While we are still some distance from outright core deflation, and while it is not our central expectation, the PCE price index excluding food and energy currently stands at 1.4% year-on-year, and the Dallas Fed’s trimmed-mean PCE index—which may well be a better measure of underlying inflation trends than the ex-food and energy index—stands at 1.0%.  These numbers are clearly below the Fed’s implicit targets, as Chairman Bernanke noted in his speech on Friday.  Moreover, this is at a time when the output/employment gap is at its largest since at least the early 1980s, and may be starting to widen once again given the economy’s transition to below-trend growth.

Second, the confidence that deflation will be avoided is at odds with the recent moves in some measures of inflation expectations.  Survey expectations have not changed much, but the decline in forward measures of breakeven inflation is noticeable.  The 5-year 5-year forward breakeven inflation rate calculated from on-the-run Treasury securities stood at 1.87% in the latest week, down from a high of 2.77% in late April 2010, and it is now at its lowest level since April 2009.  Other measures of breakeven inflation have also been declining.  A further substantial decline—say by another 30-40 basis points—would likely make Fed officials quite nervous.

Third, the statement seems to be at odds with a recent article by President Bullard of St. Louis suggesting that a continuation of the Fed’s current stance on short-term interest rates could result in deflation (see “Seven Faces of ‘The Peril’”, July 28, 2010).  The first sentence of the abstract reads: “In this paper I discuss the possibility that the U.S. economy may become enmeshed in a Japanese-style, deflationary outcome within the next several years.” Moreover, the article suggests that this is indeed a significant risk, at least if the FOMC maintains the current low-interest rate policy.  (We do not agree with President Bullard’s view that low interest rates increase the risk of deflation, but that is a separate issue.)

Fourth, the statement about the risk of deflation follows the observation a few paragraphs earlier that “[o]ne [participant] noted that survey measures of longer-run inflation expectations had remained positive in Japan throughout that country’s bout of deflation.”  This is at least noteworthy because Fed officials have frequently pointed to the stability of inflation expectations as a reason to downplay deflation concerns.

Ultimately, the FOMC’s views and policy will evolve with the data.  Further signs of economic weakness and/or disinflation over the next few months would likely increase the perceived risk of deflation, and persuade the committee to address these risks via renewed quantitative easing.  Our best guess is that this will happen in late 2010 or early 2011.  However, if the data on economic activity—especially Friday’s employment report—surprise sharply on the downside and/or breakeven inflation falls quickly, we would not rule out a move at the September 21 FOMC meeting.

Jan Hatzius

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terça-feira, 31 de agosto de 2010 BRICS, CHINA | 22:50

Pesquisa na China mostra indústria se recuperando

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Pesquisa mensal junto a 800 empresas chinesas mostra economia estabilizando em Agosto, como vemos pela pequena melhora marcada em amarelo no gráfico abaixo:

Porém os detalhes da pesquisa mostrados na tabelinha abaixo mostram que o número é melhor do que aparenta:

No total, pesquisa mostra pequena alta, como vemos na primeira linha da tabela , indo 51.2 para 51.7.….

Porém os componentes marcados em amarelo, novas encomendas locais e de exportação  e backlog de pedidos, mostram que a demanda parece ter voltado.

E o que trouxe  o número para baixo foram dados de estoques ( marcado em verde) que mostra queda dos estoques, sinalizando que indústrias tiveram que baixar estoques para atender demanda, dando um sinal positivo para produção futura, que deve subir para garantir reposição de estoques.

E finalizando, a pesquisa  de serviços, na última linha marcada em violeta, mostra uma elevação importante, que confirma a boa saúde da demanda interna e do consumo.

A CHina e os BRics são a linha de resistência na demanda global, contrastando com a queda da atividade nos EUA e riscos na Europa.

Boa notícia para nós….

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Crise na Europa | 21:32

Risco soberano volta a subir…. na Europa.

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Olha aí, a crise na Europa, se lembra? Pois é ela ainda não acabou…

De Julho para cá, risco dos países perifericos voltou a subir por lá…. ruim para ativos de risco na Europa, para o Euro e para demanda global. Só Alemanha está segurando a onda por lá…. è bom ficar atento com dados da Alemanha… se coisa esfriar por lá também, podemos ter s&P500 nos 1000 de novo….

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Câmbio, CHINA | 17:40

China provoca Americanos: CNY desvalorizando?

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Gráfico mostra cotação do dolar na china em CNYs / us$.  Em junho eles começaram a derrubar cotação , valorizando o cny em 0.86%, (movimento marcado em verde)…. porém de meados de agosto até agora o movimento foi revertido em 75% de sua magnitude ( em vermelho):

Estamos próximos das eleições nos EUA…. a chiadeira vai aumentar….. os americanos vão voltar a pressionar turma da china para que CNY seja valorizado mais rapidamente….. e tensão comercial vai subir …. no good.

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Brasil, Juros no Brasil | 14:11

Produção industrial desacelera…. no Brasil….

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Acho que economia vai andar mais devagar do que muitos esperam, apesar da renda, dos salários….

E queda parece ser generalizada, como se ve no gráfico da consultoria MCM  que mostra o percentual dos  setores da indústria que apresentaram  aumento de produção :

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EUA | 14:04

Fed Chicago e Confiança do consumidor mostram economia dos EUA andando de lado….

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Mais uma pesquisa nos EUA, e mais sinais de desaquecimento:

E confiança do consumidor não sai do lugar:

Vai precisa de um trator para tirar os caras do atoleiro…. chama o Bernanke, por favor.

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Crise na Europa, EUA, Investimentos | 06:49

GS comenta sobre impacto da redução da atividade nos EUA nos mercados

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  1. The US slowdown remains the key dynamic and the recent data has reinforced our worries there. But with markets already moving a decent way to pricing our own more downbeat growth view, it is becoming harder to find opportunities to position for slower US growth on an absolute basis. Our relative view of the US versus the rest of the world, however, is very clearly not priced and that – alongside fresh policy responses – remains our primary focus. For risk assets, easy financial conditions are an important offset to the drumbeat of negative US data surprises, but we think the market will take its cue more from signs that the US deceleration is stabilizing. Those are not clear yet, but it is that ‘second derivative’ that we think it is important to look for again. [ RECOMENDAM FICAR DE OLHO SE RITMO DA PIORA PARAR DE PIORAR… SEGUNDA DERIVADA FICAR POSITIVA]
  1. Until then, we are avoiding a strong view on direction of risk assets after an aborted attempt to short VIX futures two weeks ago. And as our latest Bond Snapshot describes, we are neutral on government bonds here with US 10-year yields already near our 3-month forecast. We have instead positioned most clearly for trades on the relative underperformance of US growth, particularly with respect to China and where we can find ‘risk-neutral’ ideas. That theme has been firmly rewarded in FX (our short MXN/CLP is close to target; and we still like AUD/CAD, where a trailing stop took us out at good gains) and in credit (where we are short consumer cyclicals against the index). In equities, the same idea has been choppier – and we closed a short in our Consumer Rotation basket a little underwater. But it is still the general idea of ‘decoupling’ that we are looking at most closely in terms of new ideas.[ ELES ACHAM QUE AS OPORTUNIDADES VÃO APARECER NO VALOR RELATIVO NOS ATIVOS DE PAISES QUE CRESCEM VS EUA]
  1. As Jan Hatzius and team have described, the US data picture is troubling. The massive pullback in housing-related data, a very weak durable goods report and a sharp drop in the Philly Fed survey have all added to the picture of a faltering final demand picture, consistent with (and perhaps even weaker) than our own forecasts. Our US Surprise Index has remained persistently negative. And while the market has not underperformed sharply on days of major US releases in August as it did in June and July, this is in part because traditionally second-tier data has been having a more pronounced negative impact. The coming week provides the usual top-tier data bonanza and our views on the major releases are generally a bit softer than consensus. [ DADOS QUE TEM SAÍDO NOS EUA VÃO CONTINUAR MOSTRANDO ECONOMIA MAIS FRACA DO QUE SE ESPERA]
  1. The big question is the extent to which our US view is priced. Consensus forecasts still have a long way to go, as Jan has showed. Blue Chip sees 2010H2 at 2.6%, down 50bp since April but well above our own 1.5% forecast and 2011 growth forecasts are still at 3% versus our own closer to 2% view. But the market appears to have made bigger adjustments. Our Wavefront baskets are consistent with a more than 100bp fall in GDP growth expectations (until end 2011) since April. That would put us at least 2/3 of the way towards pricing our own views, which implied that a roughly 150bp downgrade to US growth views was required at the time. Simple comparisons with the bond market, suggest that revisions there are at least as large and Francesco Garzarelli and team have signaled that bonds are unlikely to have much upside unless our own forecast view deteriorates further. So on an absolute basis, it is getting harder to position for softer US growth unless our own forecasts fall more. [ NÃO ACHAM QUE JUROS LONGOS DEVAM CAIR MUITO MAIS DO QUE JÁ CAIRAM POR LÁ]
  1. But it is also hard to think that risk assets can find a very firm footing as long as clear US disappointments continue. We argued in early 2009 that markets would be reassured by signs that the worst point in growth had been reached (the so-called ‘second derivative’), even if absolute growth rates were weak. With markets worrying about ‘double-dip’ risk, signs that the deceleration in the US is ending are likely to be welcome. Taking our GDP forecasts literally the slowdown is mostly behind us. After Friday’s 1.6% Q2 GDP print, our forecast of 1.5% growth trajectory for the next three quarters is ‘more of the same’. But a broader view suggests that stabilization may be further away. We see final demand growth bottoming in Q4 and the guts of the ISM alongside the Philly Fed already point to an ISM headline below 50. On that basis, it might still be a couple of months before the market can get comfortable that growth is no longer slowing. Given the importance of this point, we are watching three areas particularly closely. The first is our GLI, where we get the August final release next Wednesday after an Advanced Reading that was a touch better than July’s. The second is jobless claims, where last week’s decline is mildly reassuring. The third is the new orders-inventories balance in the ISM, which has provided a good forward guide to the production path lately.[ VAI DEMORAR ALGUM TEMPO PARA MERCADO TER BOAS NOTICIAS E COMEÇAR A SUBIR]
  1. For all the gloom from the US, there are important offsets to the more negative view. First, US cyclical sectors are already depressed, as Ed McKelvey has described, and financial stresses are also much lower as our own FSI shows. This makes it harder to envisage a sharp slowdown than two years ago. Second, and obvious in both our growth and rates forecasts, is what is going on in the rest of the world, where our forecast are above consensus in many places. In terms of the key areas of market focus, Germany continues to shine as both Erik Nielsen and Jim O’Neill have pointed out, though broader European surveys are slowing a little now. And while China’s data is yet to turn decisively, we continue to expect a gradual shift away from tightening to underpin stronger growth there as the year rolls on, though continued rumblings about possible increased bank provisioning means that the policy mix may remain more nuanced.[ FICA LIGADO NA ALEMANHA E NA CHINA]
  1. Finally, the behavior of financial conditions is still a plus so far. Despite the pressure on stocks, the sharp fall in yields means that our US FCI has stayed quite easy. And our US Private Borrowing Rate has reached its lowest level on record as housing and corporate rates have dropped sharply. This matters not just as a cushion for the US. As Jim O’Neill has pointed out, tightening US financial conditions are a more critical transmission mechanism to the rest of the world than the direct impact of US growth. So if our US FCI remains easy, decoupling also becomes easier. The near-term risk here may come from the reluctance of the Fed to embrace QE2. The FCI has already tightened since the August FOMC and this week revealed that FOMC members may not be quick to embrace the need for fresh easing. Likewise, Bernanke’s Jackson Hole speech provided a firm reminder of the Fed’s arsenal, but no sense of imminent deployment. This means that the next couple of FOMC meetings may be obstacles more than springboards for the market. The good news – as Jari Stehn has shown – is that should the Fed choose to re-engage, the first round of asset purchases suggests their actions may be quite effective.[ DE FATO FED TEM BALA, PORÉM NÃO MOSTROU NA SEMANA PASSADA QUE ESTEJA PRONTO PARA USA-LA AGORA….]
  1. ‘Decoupling’ – again core to our own forecasts – is always challenging to trade. The market will inevitably worry that slower US growth will show up in slower growth elsewhere particularly as the US damage has become more visible. And it is challenging to find implementations that don’t pick up exposure to the overall cyclical or risk picture. The recent bout of USD strength and the brief underperformance of international exposures in the US equity market show that the market is apt to doubt the resilience of others when the US data looks particularly bad. But stepping back, particularly in areas that balance China-related exposure against the US (EM versus DM indices; AUD/CAD; CLP/MXN), the trend towards non-US outperformance are still very clear. We think that trend will continue, if not broaden, even if the market loses faith periodically.
  1. Even after the latest moves, our rate forecasts look for wider rate spreads to the US at the end of the 2011 than the market currently prices in every one of the G10. It is also hard to imagine how that view can be right and the USD not ultimately weaken more. While the weakening in EUR/$ might appear to run counter to that theme – and to recent data – it may also reflect the re-emergence of sovereign risks. Those moves have been surprisingly large for the modest attention they have attracted, with Ireland at new highs post S&P downgrade and sharp widening in Portugal, Spain and Italy. We had steered clear of European exposures anticipating this resurfacing of European political risk and this has been the main motivation for our 1.22 EUR/$ 3-month forecast, in spite of a more positive longer-term view. In fact, simple models suggest that with sovereign spreads at these levels, EUR/$ could plausibly trade lower even with the better relative growth news.[PEOCUPADOS COM VOLTA DAS QUESTOES SOBRE RISCO SOBERANO NA EUROPA, SUJOS SPREADS DE RISCO JÁ SUBIRAM…]

10.  FX has been interesting in other majors, where two of our more controversial short-term forecasts (for a lower USD/JPY and substantial new lows in EUR/CHF) have been playing out. In both cases policy risk is rising as a result. For Switzerland, safe haven flows has driven the TWI to new highs. As Dirk Schumacher has described, the SNB is in the tricky position of weighing up further intervention at a time when the zero rate policy looks inappropriate for much of the economy. Japan’s challenge has been even simpler, as Robin Brooks and Fiona Lake have described. The JPY is trading very rich to fair value. But with policy rates identical to the US but a much lower inflation rate, real rates are significantly higher in Japan. Alongside the BOJ’s reluctance to ease aggressively through the balance sheet, this is leaving Japan ‘trapped’ with an inappropriately strong FX rate. Government rhetoric has increased sharply – and could increase further if Ozawa takes the helm – but the emergency BOJ meeting overnight provided only modest action. Without broader BOJ easing measures, it is unclear how sustained the impact of intervention would be, though it would certainly signal some shift. Given both US and Japanese concerns, we are also likely to see more pressure for CNY appreciation, a dynamic for which we remain positioned.

  1. Finally, is there a bond-equity disconnect? A simple picture of the 10-year yield and the SPX would suggest that bond investors are more negative and we have some sympathy with that notion. But neither asset is a straightforward reflection of market growth views and there can be good reasons why these gaps open up. If the market expects policy easing to offset growth pressure successfully bonds and equities will behave differently than if the market is simply downgrading growth. The yield curve gives clues as to which is underway and the 10s-5s slope has behaved much less ‘inconsistently’ versus equities than yield levels. Both show the market swinging from optimism about Fed easing in July (yields lower but on a steeper curve, stocks up) to growth fear in August (yields lower but flattening curve, stocks down). Stocks and bonds are also sensitive to different growth conditions. Equities are most likely to see pressure when growth is decelerating, but bond yields may drift lower as long as growth remains below trend. In that respect, the US continues to track a long a fairly typical path for a post-bust recovery. As we have shown before that has usually involved a very slow return to trend growth and fresh lows in interest rates for several years even long after stocks are past their weakest point.


Dominic Wilson
Director of Global Macro & Markets Research
Goldman, Sachs & Co.

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segunda-feira, 30 de agosto de 2010 Bancos, Juros no Brasil | 17:36

Governo se prepara para "substituir" o BNDE's…

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O governo já definiu algumas das medidas do pacote de incentivo a captações e aplicações financeiras de longo prazo. Logo após as eleições, vai isentar do Imposto de Renda as empresas que aplicarem em Letras de Crédito Imobiliário, equiparando pessoas físicas e jurídicas. Além disso, autorizará o BNDES a emitir Letras Financeiras e adotará estímulos à securitização do crédito imobiliário. Já as propostas para desoneração do Imposto de Renda nos títulos de longo prazo poderão ficar como sugestões para o próximo governo.

O programa de incentivo ao crédito de longo prazo compreende três eixos: definir qual o tamanho possível do BNDES no futuro e quais suas fontes de financiamento disponíveis; aumentar a oferta de crédito imobiliário, que cresce a taxas mais elevadas que a captação de poupança; criar um mercado de captação de recursos a partir da desoneração ou mesmo isenção do IR nos papéis de prazos mais longos. Pode-se optar pela desoneração conforme o prazo dos títulos ou, ainda, de acordo com o direcionamento dos recursos, como, por exemplo, isentar o que for investido em infraestrutura.

Um quarto aspecto desse leque de providências, que está sendo discutido entre o BNDES e a BM&F, refere-se ao fato de o banco de fomento atuar como “market maker”, usando, de início, a carteira de debêntures da BNDESpar.

O objetivo desse trabalho, conduzido pelo grupo de mercado de capitais (criado no âmbito do Ministério da Fazenda e que reune técnicos do BNDES, CVM, Banco Central, entre outros) é mapear toda a demanda por investimentos até 2014. A intenção é identificar de onde virão os recursos para elevar a taxa de investimento da economia dos atuais 19% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) para 22% do PIB nos próximos quatro anos – o que envolveria algo próximo a R$ 400 bilhões.

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Juros no Brasil | 17:29

Dr Prof. Eduardo Loyo, atual BTG e ex BC, desenha cenário para juros…

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Quem entende, entende…. Concordo no curto prazo… já para ano que vem….. eu NÃO tenho a menor idéia… vai depender de tanta coisa…

Copom Watch:  Intermission

We expect Brazil’s Monetary Policy Committee, in this week’s meeting, to leave the Selic rate unchanged at 10.75%. That is also the market consensus and the action approximately priced in by the Pre-DI market. We would thus be squarely back to one of the scenarios in the narrow range we envisaged late last year for the monetary policy cycle expected to take place in 2010 .

In our reading, the July Copom minutes already paved the way for the interruption of the tightening cycle. Above all, it did so by emphasizing that the reference scenario inflation forecasts for the first half of 2012 were already close to the target midpoint, even though they still assumed that the Selic rate would be kept constant at just 10.25% (its level prior to July’s 50 bps hike) throughout the forecasting period. As a matter of fact, neither that conditional forecast nor the overall language of the minutes entirely closed the door to an additional hike in September, but they did visibly tilt the probabilities in favor of the Copom keeping the policy rate on hold this week.

What consolidated our conviction that the Copom would indeed stand pat this week was the general tone of the public signals sent by the Central Bank’s top brass in the intermeeting period. First of all, it was apparent to us that those statements were not trying to contain the progressive migration of analysts’ calls and of market pricing towards a scenario of stability of the Selic rate at 10.75%. To that extent, the communication of the monetary authority implicitly consented to the formation of a broad consensus around a pause of the tightening cycle. Moreover, some of those statements, highlighting recent developments – domestic or external – that tended to corroborate a more benign view of the balance of risks for activity and inflation, and a more cautious approach to the dosage of monetary adjustment in the face of exacerbated uncertainties, contributed in a more active manner to shape the consensus of no further hikes for the time being.

To our mind it would have made little sense for the Central Bank, if by any chance it considered hiking rates this week, to allow, by commission or omission, for the market consensus to gradually converge to its present state. We agree, surely, that the monetary authority ought not to feel its hands tied by the expectations of market participants, and at times its perception about the macro outlook may change fast enough to render outdated even a consensus formed at the behest of its recent communication. Now, however, the existing consensus gradually shaped up in the weeks leading up to the meeting – with the visible if passive consent of the Central Bank at the very least, and arguably with some active prodding from its public statements as well. Such state of affairs would hardly have served the interests of the monetary authority if it intended to hike rates further, especially in the wake of other episodes of misunderstanding between the markets and the Central Bank regarding monetary policy communication and decisions. Quite to the contrary, we see the Central Bank’s recent intermeeting chatter (in what it said and what it consented to through silence) as redoubling the clarity with which short-term policy intentions are normally supposed to be signaled.

When a rather firm consensus like the current one is in place, attentions naturally turn from the impending policy action to what will be said by the Copom about the likely course of monetary policy in the following months. In our assessment, the cycle implemented thus far has kept ex ante real rates in expansionary territory – as much as the neutral rate may be in a process of convergence to internationally comparable levels, we do not believe it has yet fallen as far as to the neighborhood of 6% (where the baseline one-year rate has recently been). Hence our expectation that the cycle will need to be complemented once the recent soft patch in activity passes and the strength of domestic demand reasserts itself (we continue to pencil in 150bps of hikes next year, bringing the Selic rate to 12.25%). But what, then, should the Copom say at this point about the future course of policy?

Of course, it would be unreasonable for the Copom to implement the pause at this moment already indicating a presumption of its own that more tightening will be needed sooner or later. On the other hand, we would not find it advisable for the committee to express so entrenched a prior that no more hikes will be needed – let alone that cuts might soon be possible – as to actually allow all forward premia (reflecting the probability distribution of future increases in short rates) to vanish from the yield curve. The latter would keep the term structure overly depressed and render the monetary stance more stimulative given the current position of the overnight Selic rate, thus undermining the conditions for the pause. We would find ideal a middle-of-the-road position, in which the committee justifies the interruption of the cycle on the basis of its best preliminary assessment of the budget of hikes required to ensure inflation convergence at the relevant horizons, but explicitly declares nevertheless its readiness to hike rates further should the perceived improvement of the balance of risks for inflation prove merely temporary.

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EUA | 17:23

Consumo das famílias nos EUA cresce… @ 1.6% aa….

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Gráfico mostra que consumo das famílias cresce a 1.6% aa… era 3% antes da crise…. como Bernanke disse, não decolou….

Acho que FED vai ter agir mais cedo do que se imagina….

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